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MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
A REVIEW OF INTERACTIONS AND ISSUES 
ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 4/DECEMBER 2003 
HERVÉ GUYOMARD AND KATELL LE BRIS
* 
 
hen the Doha Round was undertaken in November  2001, n on-trade concerns 
(NTCs) were specifically recognised and integrated into the negotiation process, 
albeit to a limited extent. In a general way, multifunctionality opponents see 
arguments put forward by the multifunctionality proponents as an attempt by the 
corresponding countries to resist agricultural trade liberalisation and continue protecting and 
supporting agriculture.  This paper contributes to the debate by considering the broad set of 
issues associated with the design and implementation of trade, support and multifunctionality 
policies in the hope providing  policy -makers with a notion of the  issues and the trade-offs 
involved. 
1. Non-trade concerns and multilateral agricultural negotiations 
NTCs in the Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) was concluded in  1994 and WTO 
member countries had until 2000–01 to implement it. Although the concrete consequences of 
the URAA on world agriculture and agricultural support worldwide have only been very 
modest over the six-year implementation period  of  1994–95 to  2000–01, its significance 
should not be underestimated. The move away from open-ended price support in agriculture 
and the placement of agriculture on the agenda of the current round of multilateral 
negotiations, the Doha Round (Vanzetti,  1996) is of major importance. Of equal significance 
is the definition of a negotiation framework under the form of three main areas (market 
access, export competition and domestic support) to deal with agricultural issues. In other 
words, the Uruguay Round (UR) has resulted, if not in much effective agricultural 
liberalisation, at least in a framework to build on in the next rounds of agricultural 
negotiations and in particular in the Doha Round (Swinnen, 2001). 
The preamble of the URAA stated that NTCs, including food security and the need to protect 
the environment, had been taken into account in formulating the agreement. Article 20 of the 
URAA committed WTO member states to pursue the reform process. Under the so-called 
‘built-in agenda’, WTO member countries agreed that negotiations for continuing the reform 
process would be initiated one year before the end of the implementation period of the URAA 
with the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection 
while taking into account NTCs. Preliminary talks were incorporated into the broader 
negotiating agenda set at the  2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. According to 
Paragraph 13 of the Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November  2001, agricultural 
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negotiations aim at substantial improvements in market access, along with reductions of (with 
a view to phasing out), all forms of export subsidies and substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support. Paragraph 13 explicitly recognises that special and differential 
treatment for developing countries shall be an i ntegral part of all elements of the agricultural 
negotiations and  that  NTCs shall be taken into account. According to Paragraph 14, 
modalities for the further commitments on the agricultural dossier should have been 
established no later than 31 March 2003, and the agricultural negotiations should be included 
in the  conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a whole, i.e. no later than 1 January  2005 
(WTO, 2001). 
Inclusion of commitments on domestic support in the URAA was an important breakdown, 
since it explicitly recognised that domestic policies do link to international trade. In practice, 
the URAA differentiates domestic support policies according to their perceived abilities to 
impact on production and disrupt trade flows. 
•  Green box policies correspond to  domestic farm  programmes that are deemed to be 
minimally trade-distorting and as a result, are exempted from reduction commitments and 
expenditure limits. Eleven types of green box policies are distinguished, and for each type, 
specific guidelines define t he eligibility of the  programme for the green box.
1 One 
category refers to decoupled income-support,  which  is defined by three main 
requirements, i.e. (i) clearly defined eligibility criteria for a fixed base period; (ii) 
payments not related to the volume of production, prices or factors of production in any 
year after the base period; and (iii) no requirement to produce  in order  to receive 
payments. 
•  Blue box policies correspond to direct payments under production-limiting  programmes 
and are also excluded from reduction commitments. To be included in the blue box, direct 
payments must be based on fixed area and yields, or made on 85% or less of the base level 
of production or in the case of livestock payments, made on a fixed number of head. The 
US target p rice/deficiency payment  that was  in place before  1996 was a blue box 
programme. The arable area and livestock payments currently in place in the EU are also 
blue box programmes. Although blue box payments can potentially distort trade, they are 
allowed under the premise that supply-limit criteria partially offset the subsidies’ 
incentives to over-produce and disrupt trade (Burfisher, 2001). 
•  Amber box policies are defined by ‘default’. They correspond to all the measures that are 
not classified as green or b lue. The agreement provides for a  20% reduction of countries’ 
aggregate levels of amber domestic support during the six-year implementation period 
from an agreed base corresponding to the average  of the period  1986–88.
2  This 
commitment applies to the whole of the agricultural sector rather than  to  just  individual 
products. In addition, within the amber box, some  programmes can be exempted from 
reductions if their amounts are considered too small to count. These exemptions are 
referred to as ‘de minimis’ exemptions. 
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NTCs in the Doha Round 
The negotiating proposals of WTO member countries as well as the various compromise 
drafts presented by the WTO Secretariat in February  2003, March  2003 or August  2003 
adopted  the URAA framework. In a general way, they include specific commitments on 
market access, export competition and domestic support. On the domestic support dossier, the 
second draft paper on the modalities for the further commodities presented by the WTO 
Secretariat in March 2003 (the so -called ‘Harbins on 2’ paper) proposes: 
•  a 60% cut in the aggregate measure of support (AMS) for amber box policies over five 
years, with all amber box support continuing to be aggregated for all products as under the 
Uruguay Round; 
•  either a 50% reduction of the blue box support over five years or the abolition of the blue 
box by including all support of the blue box in the country AMS; and 
•  the retention of the green box, but with a tightening of conditions for including payments 
into the green box. These tightened conditions mainly relate to compensation criteria 
corresponding to government participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programmes, payments for relief from natural disasters, resource retirement programmes 
and structural adjustment assistance. In addition, the draft compromise expands the scope 
of paragraph 12 of Annex 2 of the URAA (payments under environmental  programmes) 
by explicitly including animal welfare programmes. 
European Union (EU) Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler and EU Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy reacted to this paper as follows:  
We fully appreciate Mr. Harbinson's efforts. But we do not see this draft as bringing the 
WTO M embers closer. Harbinson 2 is largely identical to the  first draft. Severe 
imbalances remain. We have tabled substantial and ambitious proposals on all items 
under the Doha mandate (domestic support, export support, market access). We have 
moved our domestic policies in the right direction, and we should continue to do so in the 
future. We do hope that realism will also prevail over unrealistic expectations in Geneva. 
As Mr. Harbinson himself proposes, technical work on export credits, food aid, special 
safeguard[s] for developing countries or non-trade concerns must now continue to 
maintain the dynamic process of the negotiations. We also believe that tariff preferences, 
crucial to many developing countries, and the rationale of the domestic support 
classification (the ‘boxes’) have to be further examined. The EU remains fully committed 
to a substantial outcome of the negotiations on agriculture within the parameters of the 
Doha Declaration.
3 
A few days later, while regretting that WTO members failed to meet the 31 March  2003 
deadline to agree on the modalities for the WTO agriculture negotiations and noting that the 
EU had done its homework to move the WTO agriculture talks forward, the EU Agriculture 
Commissioner criticised the notable absence of NTCs in the Harbinson draft: “For societies 
from Mauritius to Malta, from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, farming is also about concerns about 
the environment, food safety, safeguarding the supply of food and protecting the rural way of 
life. The Doha Declaration clearly states that they have to be an integral part of these 
negotiations” (European Commission, 2003c). 
Although there is still considerable confusion within WTO member states about what is really 
meant by the term  ‘NTCs’ or its synonym  ‘multifunctionality’, all countries agree that 
agriculture and agricultural producers provide food and non-food outputs. Some non-food 
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outputs are not (or only very partially) valued by market transactions and hence, can be under-
produced (in the case of positive non-food outputs) or over-produced (in the case of negative 
non-food outputs) relative to what society may desire. Multifunctionality proponents claim 
that production-linked payments are necessary to obtain socially desired non-food benefits 
because of the jointness relationships between agricultural production and non-food benefits. 
They also argue that countries should have more flexibility in the design of domestic policy 
relative to what is currently provided by the provisions of the URAA green box. On the other 
hand, multifunctionality opponents argue that the current green box provides sufficient 
flexibility to address non-food benefits with the least distortions on trade. Multifunctionality 
is not a sufficient basis for continuing to pursue production-linked policies, i.e. trade-
distorting policies according to the URAA classification of support policies. In their view, 
non-food benefits are better addressed through specific instruments directly linked to public 
goods or positive externalities (targeting principle) or both.4  
As noted by Bohman et al. (1999), the WTO (or more precisely, the URAA) does not make 
judgements about countries’ agricultural policy objectives under the condition that the policy 
instruments i mplemented to achieve these objectives have no, or at most minimal, trade 
distortion e ffects or effects on production. So far, analysis of policy design for 
multifunctionality has mainly been conceptual, even if the analytical framework developed by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) can be helpful to 
provide some preliminary policy guidance (Lankoski, 2003). According to the OECD (2001), 
the simultaneous analysis of supply and demand aspects of multifunctionality is necessary in 
order to arrive at appropriate policy guidance for multifunctionality. On the supply side, the 
issues are the degree of jointness between the commodity and non-commodity outputs and the 
way this degree of jointness can (or could/should) be modified. After all, if commodity and 
non-commodity outputs are non-joint, the latter can be supplied independently of the former. 
This does not mean that there is no rationale for government intervention, in particular if non-
commodity outputs are positive/negative externalities or public/bad goods , but in that case, 
domestic NTCs can be pursued largely irrespective of trade considerations. On the demand 
side, the issues are the externality and public good aspects of non-commodity outputs (such as 
problems of their measure and valuation or problems exacerbated by the fact that non-
commodity outputs are generally demanded simultaneously). Building on this analytical 
framework, the three questions to be addressed are thus, according to the OECD (2001): 
•  “Is there a strong degree of jointness  between commodity and non-commodity outputs 
that can not be altered, for example, by changes in farming practices and technologies or 
by pursuing lower cost non-agricultural provision of non-commodity outputs?” 
•  “If so, is there some market failure associated with the non-commodity outputs?” 
•  “If so, have non-governmental options (such as market creation or voluntary provision) 
been explored as the most efficient strategy?” 
The OECD clearly recognises that  “the information requirements implied by answering this 
series of questions may be onerous, and that completely unambiguous answers may not 
always be forthcoming. Availability of information could itself affect policy choices.” 
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Multifunctionality as a sufficient basis to pursue trade-distorting agricultural policies? 
In practice, the main question to be answered may thus be expressed as follows: i s support to 
farmers justified as remuneration for the non-marketed services that society expects farmers 
to provide? An intimately related question is: are trade policies or production-linked support 
policies or both efficient tools to address NTCs?  
Multifunctionality opponents do not contest that agricultural producers provide commodity 
and non-commodity outputs. They also do not contest that countries have the full sovereign 
right to choose  the domestic policy objectives they wish to pursue. They only contest the 
choice of policy instruments used to meet these objectives, rejecting  those policy instruments 
that have significant trade distortion effects. 
Trade and domestic support policies can have a negative impact on other countries by 
increasing domestic production, reducing domestic consumption, increasing export supplies, 
reducing import demands and depressing world prices. In addition, insulation of the domestic 
market transmits domestic supply and demand variability to greater variability in world 
markets and prices (ABARE, 1999). The welfare enhancing effects of trade liberalisation are 
often invoked by the opponents of agricultural protection in general  and of the 
multifunctionality argument in particular. For multifunctionality opponents, countries 
promoting trade policies or production-linked support or both on a multifunctionality basis are 
close to their AMS bindings and the multifunctionality argument ultimately amounts to 
hidden or disguised protectionism (Bohman et al.,  1999).
5 They see no reason not to follow 
the  ‘standard’ policy recommendations ,  which  consist  of letting market forces freely 
determine the level of production, consumption and trade of private goods while 
simultaneously addressing externality and public goods provision through targeted policy 
instruments, decoupled from production of commodity outputs and coupled to the provision 
of non-commodity outputs. In other words, trade liberalisation is welfare-improving, provided 
optimal domestic policies are in place to deal with positive and negative externalities. This 
assessment of course raises the questions of the identification, measurement and valuation of 
positive or negative externalities. To put it another way, this raises the question of policy 
design in a second-best world where positive and negative externalities are very unlikely to be 
fully addressed, i.e. internalised. 
2. What lessons can be drawn from economic theory? 
Multifunctionality proponents identify three main NTCs associated with agricultural 
production, namely food security, the viability of rural areas, and environmental and natural 
resource protection. They also state that these three NTCs are not only positive externalities, 
but also public goods. 
An externality corresponds to a situation where the action of one economic agent influences 
either the well-being of another consumer or the production possibilities of another producer 
in an indirect way, i.e. in a way that is not transmitted by market prices. An externality can be 
positive (for example, when the action of an agricultural producer increases the well-being of 
some consumers or decreases production costs of other producers) or negative (for example, 
when the action of an agricultural producer decreases the well-being of some consumers or 
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increases production costs of other producers). As the economic agent does not reap all the 
benefits of positive spillovers and does not support all the costs associated with negative 
spillovers, positive externalities tend to be under-supplied relative to what society desires and 
negative externalities tend to be over-supplied. There is a market failure owing to the fact that 
market prices do not include all the benefits and costs of externalities. As a result, there is 
room and legitimacy for a government intervention in order to enhance positive externalities 
and  to  reduce negative externalities. Pure public goods are defined by two characteristics: 
they are non-rival (consumption of the good by one person does not reduce the consumption 
available to another person) and non-excludable (once the good has been provided to one 
consumer, it is not possible to prevent other people from consuming it). All public goods are 
externalities, but all externalities are not public goods. Furthermore, a public good can 
increase or decrease the well-being of agents. In the first case, it is really a public ‘good’. In 
the second case, it is a public ‘bad’. 
Identification, measurement and valuation issues  
The previous paragraph immediately  raises  the question of identifying the externalities 
associated with agricultural production. Negative side effects associated with agricultural 
production essentially correspond to environmental effects. They include odour, nutrient 
runoff, pollution from herbicide and pesticide use, soil erosion, biodiversity loss, wildlife 
habitat loss, etc. Positive side  effects associated with agricultural production include food 
security (availability of food at the national level and for all the  people within the country ), 
viability of rural communities and  positive  environmental spillovers such as watershed 
protection, flood control, soil conservation, biodiversity, wildlife habitat, open space, scenic 
vistas, etc. Sometimes, they also include ‘social’ elements such as traditional country life or 
cultural heritage. Are all these side effects really externalities? If so, are they really associated 
with agricultural production? 
Rude (2000) recognises that these are external effects or public goods stemming from both 
food security and via bility of rural areas. These are not, however, external effects associated 
with agricultural production. For Rude, food security is not a positive externality associated 
with agricultural production because the externality-generating mechanism lies on the 
consumption side. Agricultural production is only a substitute for other sources of supply such 
as imports or stocks. In the same way, although  viability of rural areas can be related to 
agricultural production, it is not an externality associated with agricultural production as the 
externality-generating mechanism is employment. Agric ultural employment is only one 
source of employment in rural areas. Rude pursues this argument by noting that coupled 
production subsidies are neither appropriate nor effective intervention tools to address food 
security and the viability of rural areas. Bohman et al. (1999) arrive at the same conclusion. 
For these authors,  “there is a range of policy instruments that are more appropriate to 
addressing food security concerns than reliance on domestic production through government 
support to agriculture”. They quote public stockholding, support for research, extension and 
training, infrastructure services, temporary or emergency income assistance and domestic 
food aid. In the same way, the viability of rural areas will be more efficiently addressed by 
direct  intervention rather than trade policies, or coupled production subsidies or both.  More 
generally, direct intervention should serve  “to upgrade the quality of life in rural areas and 
help make them attractive to urban-oriented clusters”. It particular, it should ensure that rural 
areas are not disadvantaged in terms of access to public services and facilities (transportation, 
communication and education) or in terms of activity location, or both. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS  | 7 
 
Of course, multifunctionality proponents reject this analysis and  these conclusions arguing, 
for example, that food security is a by-product of domestic agricultural production, as the 
latter provides an insurance against possible supply disruptions, particularly in times of crisis 
or war. Some multifunctionality  proponents go one step further by adding that  “support 
coupled to production seems to be the most efficient way of ensuring a sufficient production 
level of public goods to the extent that these public goods are joint products of the agricultural 
production” (Lindland, 1998). Unfortunately, this claim is not formally demonstrated.  
What the previous discussion clearly shows is that there cannot be an unambiguous resolution 
to the problem of identification (Bredhal et al.,  2003). In that context, cost-benefit analysis 
can be of some help to choose among alternative regulation mechanisms.  This  idea  implies 
that it is possible, at least in an approximate way, not only to identify the externality, but also 
to measure and value it. It also implies that it is possible to measure the benefits and costs for 
both the generators and the recipients of the externality, including foreign countries. Although 
economists have developed ways to value externalities, one must immediately recognise that 
valuation poses serious difficulties. As Randall (2002) notes, the task required exceeds the 
scope of previous valuation efforts. This problem  lead s some economists to recommend the 
use of  ‘second-best’ approaches, such as c ost-effectiveness rankings, to select among 
alternative policies (Bohman et al., 1999). 
Externalities and economic theory   
In what follows, we assume that the externalities associated with agricultural production can 
be identified, measured and valued. In that context, what lessons can be drawn from economic 
theory, more precisely from welfare economics theory?  
Glebe and Latacz-Lohmann (2003) use a two-country, two -commodity output and one non-
commodity output model, where the non-commodity output corresponds to a positive or 
negative production externality associated with the production of one of the two commodity 
outputs. They use this analytical framework to determine the first-best and  the second-best 
trade and environmental policies, initially from a global point of view (maximisation of world 
social welfare)  and then  from a domestic point of view (maximisation of domestic social 
welfare). Trade policy instruments are restricted to tariffs or subsidies while environmental 
policy instruments are limited to taxes or subsidies. 
Let us first consider the results obtained when the objective function is global, social-welfare 
maximisation. These can be summarised as follows: 
i.   The globally optimal,  first-best trade policy is free trade,  where  the environmental 
externality is fully internalised using the standard Pigouvian tax or subsidy. 
ii.  When the trade policy is fixed, i.e. when trade is not free, the globally optimal 
environmental tax or subsidy differs from the standard Pigouvian instrument, as it should 
take into account the distortion induced by the trade policy measure. 
iii.  In the same way, when the environmental policy is given and different from its Pigouvian 
value, there is room for a trade policy to take into account the fact that the environmental 
policy is not necessarily optimal. 
Now we consider the results derived under the assumption that only domestic social welfare is 
maximised. These can be summarised as follows: 8 | GUYOMAR & LE BRIS 
i.   The domestically optimal, first-best policy is a tariff/subsidy on imports/exports to modify 
the terms of trade effects and a Pigouvian tax/subsidy  in order to fully internalise the 
environmental externality. 
ii.  When the trade instrument is predetermined and considered as an exogenous parameter, 
the second-best Pigouvian tax/subsidy should take into account the fact that the trade 
policy is not necessarily optimal. 
iii.  Symmetrically, when the environmental policy is considered as given, the second-best 
tariff/subsidy on imports/exports should take into account the fact that the environmental 
policy is not necessarily optimal. 
First-best results are well-known. 6 Second-best results are more interesting. They show that 
free trade is no longer the globally optimal policy when the externality is not fully 
internalised. Symmetrically, as long as international trade is not fully liberalised, the standard 
Pigouvian tax/subsidy does not maximise social welfare because it does not take into account 
distortion effects induced by the trade policy instrument. These results do not, however, 
question the fact that free trade is optimal when appropriate domestic policies are in place to 
deal with positive and negative externalities, i.e. when externalities are fully internalised. This 
last result immediately raises the question of the possibility  of implementing the first-best 
policy, even in this simplified framework, with only two commodity outputs and one non-
commodity output.  
More generally, it raises the question of the optimality of second-best policies when, for 
various reasons, the  first-best policy cannot be implemented. A well-known result of the 
second-best theory is that as long as there are distortions in an economy, any attempt to 
address one particular restriction may in fact reduce social welfare. Applied to the 
multifunctionality issue, this result means that as long as trade and production distorting 
agricultural policies remain, any attempt to fix the negative/positive externality problem by a 
tax/subsidy or another regulation may in fact (at least theoretically) reduce social welfare. The 
reverse also applies. As long as agricultural positive/negative externalities remain unresolved 
or only partially and imperfectly resolved, agricultural trade policy reforms may (at least 
theoretically) reduce social welfare. From a political point of view, this analysis also raises 
the question of the sequencing of reforms, i f for various reasons ( political reasons in 
particular), all necessary reforms from a theoretical point of view cannot be simultaneously 
implemented. This can be summarised by the following sentence quoted from Burrell (2001): 
“should trade be liberalised first before optimal policies to internalise externalities are in place 
or should trade reform wait for optimal policies to protect for the provision of positive 
externalities [as well as the reduction of negative externalities]”.  
Paarlberg et al. ( 2002)  confirm  the  Glebe and Latacz-Lohmann results by showing that 
multifunctionality never justifies trade policies. They assume that agricultural production 
generates the non-market outputs that society values. The home country social-utility function 
depends thus on the consumption of one non-agricultural composite good (the numéraire), the 
consumption of the various agricultural goods and externalities (Ej, j from 1 to  k) linked to 
agricultural outputs (qi,  i from 1 to  n). They assume that each externality increases social 
welfare, but the effect of a particular agricultural output on the various externalities is not 
restricted in sign. Several conclusions can be derived from  first-order conditions that define 
the Pareto outcome (maximisation of domestic social welfare). 
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•  First, the presence of externalities in the domestic social utility function does not free 
justify trade policies. International market power is the only justification for a non-zero 
trade policy. As a result, for a small country, which cannot affect world prices, there is no 
room for trade policies and free trade is the optimal outcome. 
•  Second, externalities linked to agricultural outputs justify a price wedge between the 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the marginal rate of transformation for 
the various agricultural products. This result is obtained without imposing a fixed 
relationship between one agricultural output and one particular externality. 
•  Third, policy alternatives can be ranked. In the small country case, these can  be ordered as 
follows: 1) first-best, producer subsidies or taxes reflecting the domestic externalities 
combined with  trade; 2) second-best, no producer interventions combined with free trade; 
and 3) third-best, trade intervention only. In the large country case, these can be ranked as 
follows:  1)  first-best, producer subsidies or taxes reflecting the domestic externalities 
combined with trade interventions arising from the nation’s international market power; 2 ) 
second-best, trade interventions only; and 3 ) third-best, no producer interventions 
combined with free trade. 
•  Fourth, interventions are country-specific because externality valuation is country -
specific. As a result, optimal interventions will be at different levels in each country. 
In addition, Paarlberg et al. define a strategy to  ‘practically’ address agricultural externalities 
in WTO negotiations. The strategy they propose mimics the approach adopted in the UR on 
the domestic support dossier, by following a three-step approach:  the  definition of  a 
conceptual framework (the AMS); multilateral negotiations on policies to be included in this 
support measure; and agreement on reduction commitments. For dealing with 
multifunctionality in WTO negotiations, they also propose a three-step approach consisting 
in, first, the identification of externalities associated with agricultural production, second, the 
valuation of these externalities and third, the measurement of the specific linkage  between 
each externality and each agricultural output.7 They argue that “payments determined this way 
would be counted as green box even if production-related ”. It is clear that such a strategy will 
be very difficult to implement in practice. As shown in the previous section, there is clearly 
no consensus among countries about the definition of the positive or negative externalities 
associated with agricultural production. Valuation is difficult and controversial, as well as the 
measurement of the relationship between one specific externality and agricultural production. 
Fullerton (2001) develops a very simple analytical framework that can be used to compare 
efficiency (measured here in terms of the optimal amount of pollution) and distributional 
effects of eight types of environmental policies,  including command and control (CAC) 
instruments as well as incentive instruments. He shows that the eight instruments can be 
designed to have the same efficiency effects but that they have very different distributional 
consequences. The model used by Fullerton corresponds to a closed economy. Nevertheless, 
his main conclusion (in reality, a very well-known result) immediately relates to the case of 
an open economy: different environmental policies can be used to achieve the same results on 
pollution, but they generally differ in terms of distributional effects. This conclusion raises 
two questions in the context of the debate on trade-multifunctionality interactions and the 
various instruments that can be used to address NTCs. The  first is that agricultural trade 
reform is welfare-improving for each participant in each country only if there are 
                                                                   
7 In a more recent paper, Bredhal et al. (2003) provide further discussion on these three steps (conditions), i.e. 
issues of identification, measurement and valuation, and the linkage to output. 10 | GUYOMAR & LE BRIS 
compensating transfers from gainers to losers. The second is that Fullerton’s conclusion, more 
generally the optimality of free trade (providing  that  optimal domestic policies are in place to 
deal with NTCs), rests on several assumptions, in particular one time period, perfect certainty, 
perfect competition and no transaction costs. In that context, the second part of Fullerton’s 
paper is particularly interesting since it discusses other criteria outside the simple models that 
have to be taken into account for further evaluation of policy choices. These criteria include: 
i.   economic efficiency measurement (Fullerton measures economic efficiency in terms of 
the optimal amount of pollution while economic efficiency also requires minimising the 
cost of achieving the optimal abatement); 
ii.  administrative efficiency (minimising administrative costs to government and 
compliance costs to firms and taxpayers); 
iii.  monitoring and enforcement (measurement of the regulated pollutant in a way that 
discourages evasion); 
iv.  information and uncertainty (characterisation of efficient policy in an imperfect world 
with information asymmetry and uncertainty); 
v.   political and ethical considerations, in particular political feasibility; 
vi.  equity and distributional effects (net effects on different demographic categories, for 
example young and old, rural and urban or rich and poor ); 
vii.  other distortions, in particular because markets are far from being perfect; and 
viii. flexibility and dynamic adjustments. This point is particularly relevant in the context of 
trade-multifunctionality interactions. It relates to the  ‘flexibility’ criterion, i.e. the 
flexibility of the government to adjust policy rules as information, measurement and 
valuation improve as well as the flexibility of the economy to adjust production of 
commodity and non-commodity outputs. 
3. Conclusion 
From the previous discussion, it is possible to summarise as follows what economic analysis 
says about first-best and second-best policies when governments are welfare-maximising and 
there is perfect information and competition. Provided corrective policies properly internalise 
positive and negative externalities, trade liberalisation benefits all countries. If externalities 
are not adequately  addressed, trade liberalisation may not beneficial to some countries but 
even in this case, which corresponds to reality, trade policies are unlikely to be second-best 
ways of dealing with positive or negative externalities (Sturm and Ulph,  2002). According to 
the policy-targeting principle, NTCs associated with agricultural production should ideally be 
addressed through specific, i.e. targeted instruments. Even in this ideal world,  such as in a 
first-best context, policies used to address NTCs are likely to be country-specific, reflecting 
differences in preferences among countries.  
These normative conclusions rest on several assumptions. In particular, in the context of the 
multifunctionality dossier, they rest on the assumptions that there is an unambiguous 
identification of externalities associated with agricultural production and that these 
externalities can be properly measured and valued. Assigning monetary values to externalities 
is necessary to assess the full costs and benefits of trade policy reforms, as well as domestic 
policy reforms or corrective mechanisms aiming at decreasing external effects or increasing 
the provision of amenities. Yet one must clearly recognise that research on this point is still in MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS | 11 
 
the early stages. As a result, normative research must be completed by positive approaches. 
Quantitative analyses should be developed to assess the potential impacts of agricultural 
policy reforms on NTCs and inversely, the potential impacts of  ‘multifunctionality’ policies 
on agricultural production and trade. Cooper et al. did this exercise for the United States by 
first evaluating the environmental effects in the US of a trade liberalisation scenario involving 
the elimination of all agricultural policy distortions in all trading countries (Cooper, Peters 
and Claassen,  2003),  then by quantifying the  effects of US agri-environmental payment 
policies on US agricultural trade (Cooper, Johansson and Peters,  2003b).
8  Many 
environmental effects, however, are not included in these analyses. More generally, they do 
not consider other aspects of multifunctionality related to food security and rural 
development. 
                                                                   
8 The second analysis shows in particular that US agri-environmental programmes have very small effects on 
trade. In other words, they are minimally trade-distorting and hence can rightfully be considered as green box 
measures. | 12 
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